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Theoretical IO models of horizontal mergers and acquisitions make the critical as-
sumption of eﬃciency gains. Without eﬃciency gains, these models predict either that
mergers are not proﬁtable or that mergers are welfare reducing. A problem here is the
empirical observation that on average mergers do not create eﬃciency gains. We analyze
mergers in a model where ﬁrms cannot equalize marginal costs and marginal revenues over
all dimensions in their action space due to constraints. In this type of model mergers can
still be proﬁtable and welfare enhancing while they create a loss in eﬃciency. The merger
allows a ﬁrm to relax constraints. Further, this set up is consistent with the following
stylized facts on mergers and acquisitions: M&A’s happen when new opportunities have
opened up or industries have become more competitive (due to liberalization), they hap-
pen in waves, shareholders of the acquired ﬁrms gain while shareholders of the acquiring
ﬁrms lose from the acquisition. Standard IO merger models do not explain these empirical
observations.
Keywords: Pro/anti-competitive mergers, eﬃciency defence, constraints, merger waves,
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11. Introduction
Current competition policy regarding horizontal mergers starts from the trade oﬀ between mar-
ket power and eﬃciency gains. This trade oﬀ was ﬁrst formalized by Williamson (1968). A
horizontal merger without eﬃciency gains leads to higher prices due to market power and lower
welfare due to deadweight loss. To the extent that the merger reduces marginal costs, prices
decrease and the merger can raise welfare. As argued below, empirical evidence suggests that
for most mergers such eﬃciency gains do not materialize (in fact, often eﬃciency is reduced
after the merger). Theory suggests that horizontal mergers without eﬃciency gains are ei-
ther unproﬁtable (Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983)) or welfare reducing (Deneckere and
Davidson (1985)).1 Taking these models and the empirical evidence seriously, the majority of
horizontal mergers should simply be abolished. Unless the ﬁrms can convincingly argue that
there will be eﬃciency gains, the prior probability of eﬃciency gains is small. Most likely then
the merger is driven by a desire to increase market power which is welfare reducing. Based on
this reasoning it is hard to understand why competition authorities spend so much resources
on merger control.2
We present a model where ﬁrms face constraints that can be alleviated by acquiring assets
through mergers. This allows for mergers that do not raise eﬃciency (or even reduce it) but
which are proﬁtable and can still be pro competitive. In this sense, the model here gives
a rationale for scrutinizing mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s) carefully without relying on
eﬃciency gains. The model is consistent with stylized facts like M&As happen after industry
shocks, they tend to happen in waves, target ﬁrms gain from an acquisition while acquiring
ﬁrms loose. These stylized facts tend to be emphasized more in the ﬁnance literature (see
references below) on M&A’s than in the industrial economics literature on antitrust. In this
sense, the paper tries to bridge a gap between these two literatures.
The theory presented here can be applied to both horizontal and conglomerate mergers.
A conglomerate merger is between ﬁrms that are not on the same (relevant) market (would
be a horizontal merger) and that are not active in the same value chain (would be a vertical
merger).3 Using the standard framework, a conglomerate merger is only proﬁtable if it either
1Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) derive their result in a Cournot model and Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) in a Bertrand set up. However, these results also hold if the mode of competition is generalized to supply
functions as shown by Akg¨ un (2004).
2Indeed there is a debate in the literature whether money spent on antitrust enforcement is worthwhile; see
Crandall and Winston (2003) and Baker (2003) for opposing views on this.
3Below we do not explicitly model externalities between the merging ﬁrms as in Rey and Verg´ e (2005).
2raises eﬃciency (e.g. through economies of scope) or creates market power (e.g. through
portfolio eﬀects, see Bishop and Walker (2002, pp. 291)). Thus, if eﬃciency gains are unlikely
(as they seem to be), the market power eﬀect remains and conglomerate mergers tend to be
welfare reducing. Again, with the idea that ﬁrms merge to alleviate constraints, mergers can
be proﬁtable and welfare enhancing without relying on eﬃciency gains.
We present three examples to motivate that mergers can be driven by constraints faced by
ﬁrms instead of (potential) eﬃciency gains. First, when in 1994 Reed Elsevier acquired Mead
Data Central, the main reason given was not eﬃciency gains. Reed Elsevier was a publisher for
scientiﬁc, professional and business readers and its strength was mainly in print products. With
the acquisition of Mead Data Central it sought entry into electronic publishing (see Reed to pay
$ 1.5 billion for Mead Data Central (1994) and Reed Elsevier to spend $ 1.5 billion for Mead
Data Central (1994)). In other words, this acquisition opened up an opportunity or a market for
Reed Elsevier (electronic publishing) that it did not have before. As Reed Elsevier and Mead
Data Central were not active on the same market, this is best characterized as a conglomerate
merger. Second, consider the horizontal acquisition in 1989 of Uniroyal Goodrich by Michelin.
Michelin had positioned itself in the US as a producer of premium, upscale tires. Yet, the
replacement tire sale was the most proﬁtable segment in the US and by the end of the eighties
50% of these sales came from lower-end brands. Hence Michelin needed a way to penetrate that
market segment and the acquisition made sure this happened fast (see Rivera Brooks (1989)
and Davis (1989)). A third example is the acquisition of Stokely-Van Camp by Quaker Oats
in 1983. Quaker was especially (if not only) interested in Stokely’s Gatorade brand. Stokely
distributed this beverage only regionally and did not market it aggressively. Quaker wanted to
apply its advertising capabilities and international distribution network to introduce Gatorade
in new markets (Robust growth of Gatorade nets a payoﬀ to Quaker (1990) and Is Stokely worth
Quaker’s lofty bid? (1983)). Hence Quaker had capacity left to market and distribute another
brand, but its constraint was that it did not have another brand to market. Acquiring Gatorade
made sure this capacity could be used again. In each of these examples, the merger was not
motivated by eﬃciency gains but by opening up new markets and opportunities.
As a further illustration of this, Wasserstein (2000, pp. 193) in a popular book on M&A’s
describes Rosen’s Cube which ’shows a company inside the box anxious to burst out and achieve
growth, but constrained by external limitations and its resources. Breaking through the box
Therefore the theory developed here is not directly applicable to vertical mergers. This is left for future
research.
3of constraints is the obsession of top management.’ This idea of acquisitions as opening up
new markets and opportunities is in line with the view of Mackey McDonald (chairman and
CEO of VF Corporation) that an ’acquisition becomes attractive if it oﬀers us a new consumer
segment or geographic market to sell our products to or if it adds new products to one of our
core categories’ (Carey (2000)). This is the way we model mergers here. A merger does not
raise ﬁrms’ eﬃciency levels but it allows ﬁrms to do something they could not do before.
Two types of constraints that we use as illustrations of the general theory of constraints
are capital market constraints and time constraints. Empirical papers showing that ﬁrms
face capital market constraints include Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1994) and Whited (1992) (also see Hubbard (1998) for a survey). The idea of
these papers is that (after controlling for investment opportunities) investments are positively
correlated with cash ﬂows.4 That is, if ﬁrms have more money, they invest more. This would
not happen with perfect capital markets. Capital market constraints as a consideration guiding
mergers and acquisitions goes back to the well known Boston Consulting Group (BSC) growth-
share matrix (see, for instance, Henderson (1976)). The matrix was developed to help ﬁrms
create a healthy portfolio of business units where Cash Cows (business units with a high market
share that need only little investment) can be used to ﬁnance Stars (high market share units
that also need substantial investments) and Question Marks (units with small market share
that need big investments). The implicit assumption here is a capital market imperfection. If
capital markets were perfect, a ﬁrm could just borrow from a bank to ﬁnance investments in
Stars and Question Marks. Acquisitions would not be needed to generate cash. With imperfect
capital markets a ﬁrm may have proﬁtable business opportunities for which it cannot ﬁnd the
money to invest. Acquiring another ﬁrm that does generate cash may then help to ﬁnance
the new business opportunities. Hubbard and Palia (1999) provide evidence for this internal
capital market view for acquisitions in the 1960s.
Most of the assets acquired through a take over can also be obtained by internal growth and
investment by a ﬁrm. To illustrate, in the Reed Elsevier - Mead Data Central example above,
Reed Elsevier could have decided to generate the required knowledge for electronic publishing
by internal training of existing workers and hiring of new employees. However, in the words
of Alex Mandl (chairman and CEO of Teligent) the ’plain fact is that acquiring is much faster
than building. And speed –speed to market, speed to positioning, speed to becoming a viable
company– is absolutely essential in the new economy’ (see Carey (2000)). Hence the initial
4Also Schroth and Szalay (2005) show that ﬁrms invest more in R&D if they have more cash available.
4constraint of lacking expertise or certain products is transformed into a time constraint and
M&As form a swifter route to a solution than in-house expansion of expertise and products.
Below we explicitly model this type of time constraint.
As mentioned, merger models without constraints need eﬃciency gains to make mergers
proﬁtable and welfare enhancing. Although there are indeed mergers generating eﬃciency
gains for the merging ﬁrms (see, for instance, Focarelli and Panetta (2003)), the evidence on
this issue is actually not overwhelming. Many papers surveyed in Mueller (1997) and R¨ oller,
Stennek and Verboven (2000) are not able to detect eﬃciency gains on average, others actually
ﬁnd that mergers on average lead to eﬃciency losses. Mueller (1997, pp. 663/4) concludes
that the ’pattern of merger activity in the United States and the United Kingdom over the
past century is inconsistent with the hypothesis that mergers are primarily intended to increase
eﬃciency’. Similarly, R¨ oller, Stennek and Verboven (2000, pp. 36) ﬁnd that ’there seems to be
no support for a general presumption that mergers create eﬃciency gains ... in particular cases,
however, mergers do create eﬃciencies’. Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu and Zulehner (2003, pp. 649)
in an international study ﬁnd that ’Roughly the same fraction of mergers reduced eﬃciency as
increased it’. They further ﬁnd that roughly half of the mergers that raised proﬁts did so by
increasing market power. Finally, Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 174) conclude that ’statistical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that proﬁtability and eﬃciency increase following mergers
is at best weak. Indeed, the weight of the evidence points in the opposite direction: eﬃciency
is reduced on average following merger’. Mueller (1985, pp. 266) considering mergers in the US
in the period 1950-1972 concludes that ’no support was found for the hypothesis that mergers
improve eﬃciency by consolidating the sales of the acquired companies on their most eﬃcient
product lines’.
Another source of evidence on mergers’ eﬃciency and proﬁtability is the literature on ﬁrms’
performance on the stock market. Agrawal, Jaﬀe and Mandelker (1992) ﬁnd that ’stockholders
of acquiring ﬁrms suﬀer a statistically signiﬁcant loss of about 10% over the ﬁve-year post-
merger period’. Agrawal and Jaﬀe (2000) provide an extensive review of the literature examin-
ing long-run stock returns following acquisitions. They conclude that there is ’strong evidence
of abnormal under-performance following mergers’. Also Pautler (2001, pp. 29) concludes in
his survey of the literature that ’multi-industry studies ﬁnd that mergers are unproﬁtable in a
signiﬁcant percentage of instances’. Further, Moeller, Schkingemann and Stulz (2005) report
that in the 1990s acquiring (US) ﬁrms’ shareholders lost an aggregate $216 billion. In addition
they claim (pp. 759) that ’The large losses from 1998 through 2001 cannot be explained by a
5wealth transfer from acquiring-ﬁrm shareholders to acquired-ﬁrm shareholders. We ﬁnd that
the aggregate combined value of acquiring and acquired ﬁrms falls by a total of $134 billion for
the sample of public ﬁrm acquisition announcements from 1998 through 2001’. This has led
some commentators to the conclusion that merger decisions are actually not taken in a rational
way. Hubris and empire building are often mentioned (Roll (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1988)) as explanations why managers undertake such mergers. Below we analyze rational
mergers and explain why the empirical researcher looking at the data may still conclude that
the merger was not proﬁtable. Yet, it seems fair to conclude that (on average) eﬃciency gains
cannot be strong otherwise one would see proﬁtable mergers more often.
Based on this observation, we argue that standard industrial economics models of mergers
miss important aspects. If the trade oﬀ is only between market power and eﬃciency gains, it
is hard to understand why competition authorities allow so many mergers that do not raise
eﬃciency and hence are motivated by market power. Of course, competition authorities do not
scrutinize all mergers (only the ones where market shares involved are high) and they decide
under uncertainty. Similarly, ﬁrms decide under uncertainty. Hence ex ante eﬃciency gains
may be expected that are not materialized ex post. Yet, the evidence cited above does suggest
some mergers are motivated by other factors than eﬃciency gains and market power. This
paper looks at constraints as such a factor.
In a model where ﬁrms face constraints we can understand why mergers (are allowed to)
happen even if they do not generate eﬃciency gains. We also consider the following stylized
facts that cannot be dealt with in the standard Cournot/Bertrand-Nash framework. First, a
consistent ﬁnding in the ﬁnance literature (see Pautler (2001)) is that shareholders of target
ﬁrms tend to gain (handsomely sometimes) while the shareholders from the acquiring ﬁrm
do not gain much and sometimes even lose from the merger. Second, mergers often happen
after new opportunities open up, for instance after the government liberalizes a sector or after
new technological breakthroughs open up new markets (see Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord
(2001) and Wasserstein (2000)). Sometimes both phenomena are linked as in the case where
the government auctions frequencies for mobile telephony. Third, historically, mergers have
happened in waves (see Andrade, Mitchell and Staﬀord (2001) and Weston, Siu and Johnson
(2001)).
This paper is related to the theoretical industrial economics literature on mergers. As
noted by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) mergers without eﬃciency gains are actually
unproﬁtable in Cournot equilibrium. The reason is that the output level of the merged ﬁrm is
6smaller than the sum of output levels of the ﬁrms before the merger. This has triggered a number
of reactions deriving conditions under which a merger is proﬁtable. Deneckere and Davidson
(1985) show that mergers in a Bertrand game are proﬁtable due to upward sloping reaction
functions (see below). Perry and Porter (1985) explicitly introduce a capital stock variable to
model that the merger may increase the size of the ﬁrm. McAfee, Simons and Williams (1992)
consider a model of spatial competition between ﬁrms. A merger then combines the outlets
of the ﬁrms at diﬀerent locations and thus leads to a bigger ﬁrm. Farrel and Shapiro (1990)
explicitly model three types of cost savings from a merger: the merged ﬁrms can rationalize
output across their plants, they can shift capital to its most productive uses and they can learn
from each other’s experiences. These possibilities allow for mergers that are proﬁtable and
welfare enhancing. However, as mentioned, empirical evidence suggests that many mergers are
not motivated by eﬃciency gains. Further, these papers do not explain why mergers happen
in waves or why acquiring ﬁrms see their proﬁts reduced after the merger.
Another literature on mergers without eﬃciency gains looks at mergers as a way to reduce
overcapacity in declining industries, see for instance Dutz (1989), Fridolfsson and Stennek
(forthcoming) and Lambrecht and Myers (2005). Such mergers also give the impression that
mergers are not proﬁtable if one does not correct for the fact that they happen in declining
industries. However, if the ﬁrm had not merged, its proﬁts would have been (even) lower.
Other arguments why mergers happen although there are no eﬃciency gains in production
are taxation and implicit contracts. Sometimes there are tax advantages to be gained from a
merger. However, as argued by Weston, Siu and Johnson (2001, pp. 149) taxes ’are likely to
be a reinforcing inﬂuence rather than the major force in sound merger’. Further, Shleifer and
Summers (1988) discuss the idea that a (hostile) takeover can be proﬁtable because the new
owner does not honor the implicit contracts with other stakeholders in the ﬁrm. Although this
can create hold up problems as stakeholders cannot be sure that their implicit contracts will be
honored in the future, it can still be proﬁtable (at least in the short run). As an example, one
can think of promised wage increases that are not granted by the new management. From the
point of view of our framework, this is still an example of an eﬃciency gain as labor becomes
cheaper (in the short run where the hold up problem is expected to be less severe). Hence this
motive for mergers suﬀers from the same critique as above that eﬃciency gains are actually
not that prevalent (alternatively, the eﬃciency losses due to breaking the implicit agreement
dominate, but then this cannot justify a rational merger).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section considers a simple model of capital
7market imperfections and illustrates the main results. Section 3 presents a general model of
mergers when ﬁrms face constraints. In such a model, mergers can reduce eﬃciency (raise
marginal costs) and still be proﬁtable and welfare enhancing. Then we analyze the timing of
mergers and why rational mergers can be followed by a reduction in ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Section 5
presents a more detailed model of capital market imperfections and a model of time constraints.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Three simple examples with capital market constraints
In this section, we consider three simple examples to show how constraints causing a wedge
between marginal revenue and marginal costs can explain the following stylized facts (SF):
SF.1 M&A’s do not raise productivity on average;
SF.2 M&A’s happen after new opportunities have opened up;
SF.3 M&A’s happen after the sector has become more competitive (say, due to a liberalization);
SF.4 M&A’s happen in waves;
SF.5 shareholders of the acquired ﬁrm gain from the acquisition;
SF.6 shareholders of the acquiring ﬁrm do not gain much and can sometimes lose from the
acquisition.
SF. 1 has been discussed and documented in the introduction. Reasons why eﬃciency de-
creases after a merger include a clash of company cultures and increased free riding as the size
of the ﬁrm increases.5 Mitchell and Mulherin (1996, pp. 194) show for the mergers in the 1980s
that SF. 2, 3 and 4 are connected: ’our analysis shows that takeover activity in the 1980s clus-
ter disproportionately at the industry level. Moreover, we ﬁnd that industries experiencing the
greatest amount of takeover activity in the 1980s are those exposed to the greatest fundamen-
tal shocks’. As examples of shocks they mention deregulation and technological advancements.
They give the following examples of industries with major takeover activity due to deregulation
5This can be formalized as follows. Suppose that performance contracts can only be written on the overall
result of the ﬁrm. Further, assume that the sum of individual eﬀort levels (ei for agent i) increase proﬁts. Then
in a ﬁrm with n employees, each employee gets
 n
i=1 ei/n and an increase in n reduces the return to agent i of
his own eﬀort level ei.
8during the 1980s: Air Transport (Airline Deregulation Act of 1978), Broadcasting (Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984), Natural Gas (Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978) and Truck and
Transport Leasing (Trucking deregulation of 1980). Further, they mention that sectors where
M&A’s were triggered due to increased competition (sometimes foreign competition) include
Apparel, Metals and Mining and Packaging and Containers.
The constraint we focus on in this section is a capital market constraint. Here we make
the extreme assumption that ﬁrms cannot borrow at all (below we consider a more elaborate
model of capital market imperfections). In particular, we assume the following. It is possible
to hold cash money from one period to the next. It is not possible to borrow now and promise
to repay in the future (say, due to some moral hazard problem of people taking the money and
run). Agents can hold assets, but assets cannot be used as collateral nor is it possible that
more than one agent owns the same asset (i.e. it is not possible to issue equity).
We consider a three period model, ﬁrst with three agents denoted a,b and c. Table 1
summarizes the ownership structure of these agents. Agent a holds at t = 1 ﬁve units of cash
money and an asset that will yield 7 units of cash in t = 2. Agents b and c hold no cash at
t = 1 but each has an asset. Agent b’s asset will yield 7 in the next period and c’s asset will
yield 13. Each of these assets yields zero in t = 3. At the end of the second period (i.e. after
the returns in table 1 have been realized) a new asset will be auctioned that yields v/δ units of
cash in t = 3 (this return is the same for each agent to keep things simple). For concreteness,
assume that a second price auction will be used to allocate this new asset at the end of t = 2.6
Each agent has the following utility function u(c1,c2,c3) = c1 + δc2 + δ2c3 where δ ∈  0,1 
denotes the discount factor. Assume that v > 7. Then the discounted value of the agent’s ﬁrm
(deﬁned as cash holdings plus the asset owned by the agent) equals
Va = 5 + δ7 (1)
Vb = δ7 (2)




At the end of period 2, ﬁrm c bids its valuation (which then equals δv/δ =) v > 7 (and at
maximum its cash holdings 13) for the new asset. Thus ﬁrm c always outbids the other two
ﬁrms and hence there is no reason for ﬁrm a to hold its cash till period 2. Since a knows he
6One can think here of a government using an auction to allocate a license. Alternatively, the auction can be
seen as a simple model of competition for a market, like an R&D race where the ﬁrm that spends the most on
R&D wins the patent or a price war where the ﬁrm with the lowest price wins the market in a war of attrition
framework.




Table 1: Cash and asset returns for the agents a,b and c.
cannot gain by outbidding c at the end of t = 2 (even if he would save his cash ﬂow from the
ﬁrst period), a consumes his cash in the ﬁrst period. Consequently, the highest bid that agent
c faces is 7 to get an asset worth v > 7.
Now assume that agent a uses his cash money at t = 1 to buy the asset from agent b at price
p.7 This is an acquisition. Clearly, b is only willing to sell if p ≥ 7δ and the maximum amount
a can pay equals a’s cash holding 5. Thus p ∈ [7δ,5] (note that no acquisition is possible if
5 < 7δ). If a acquires b and assuming that v > 13, the values of the two remaining ﬁrms equal
Vab = 5 − p + δ(14 + v − 13) (4)
Vc = 13δ (5)
Now ﬁrm ab has an amount of cash equal to 14 at t = 2 and thus can outbid ﬁrm c to obtain
the asset worth v > 13. Clearly, the acquisition is proﬁtable for ﬁrm a if Vab > Va, which is the
case for v big enough.
Using this example, we can already understand a number of the stylized facts above. First,
note that we do not assume that the merger leads to eﬃciency gains. The return to the assets
of a and b at t = 2 are assumed to be unchanged. In fact, we can even assume that there is
an eﬃciency loss due to the merger so that the returns at t = 2 equal 7 − ε for some ε > 0.8
Hence this idea that ﬁrms are constrained (here due to a cash constraint) can make M&A’s
rational while satisfying stylized fact SF.1. Second, if v ≤ 13 there is no reason to merge. If
ﬁrms’ current activities generate enough cash to continue business in new projects (buy new
assets), there is no reason to undertake M&A. Only when business is not as usual in the sense
that new opportunities pop up that are worth far more than current business generates in
cash returns, there is an incentive to acquire other ﬁrms to overcome your constraints. This is
how we interpret SF.2. When new opportunities appear that are exceptional compared to past
7We assume that b’s asset is indivisible and hence it is not possible to buy part of the asset.
8Of course, the eﬃciency loss ε cannot be too big since the merged entity ab must still be able to outbid c.
For v big enough, ε has to satisfy 19 − p − 2ε > 13.
10business there is an incentive to merge.9 Further, note that ﬁrm a is willing to pay its whole
cash holdings (equal to 5) to acquire b if v is big enough. Although we have not modeled the
bargaining here between a and b, it is clear that p > 7δ is certainly possible here. If there was
another ﬁrm like a with cash, they could bid up the price for b to 5. This explains SF.5: the
acquired ﬁrm owner gains handsomely from the M&A. The cash constraint also explains the
popular notion that it is ’eat or be eaten’ in the M&A market. Because of the cash constraint
at t = 1 it is less likely that bigger ﬁrms can actually be aﬀorded in an acquisition. Finally, the
reason why acquiring b helps a in alleviating the cash constraint is that b on its own cannot
proﬁt to the same extent from the new opportunity as a can (here, in fact, b cannot beneﬁt at
all from the new opportunity). The other three stylized facts we consider below.
First, consider why constraints are important here. The constraint here is that ﬁrms cannot
borrow to buy the new opportunity with value v > 13. Since 13 is the highest bid, there is
a wedge v − 13 > 0 which explains why ﬁrms are willing to lose eﬃciency in an acquisition
to circumvent their (cash) constraint. With a perfect capital market, a ﬁrm just borrows the
amount of money it wants to bid in the auction and hence there is no reason to acquire another
ﬁrm; certainly not if an acquisition reduces eﬃciency.
To understand how competition plays a role in M&A, we consider the situation where the
new opportunity is allocated in an uncompetitive way. For ease of exposition, consider the
extreme case where in an industry with N ﬁrms, each ﬁrm has probability 1/N to win the next
opportunity.10 This could be the situation before the market is liberalized and the government
allocates the new opportunity randomly. After the liberalization, the new opportunity is auc-
tioned in the way described above. Although this comparison between auction and lottery is a
bit extreme, it does capture the following property of more intense competition. As competi-
tion intensiﬁes, ﬁrms’ actions aﬀect the outcome more. In the lottery, every ﬁrm has the same
probability of winning, irrespective of its investment in the new project. In an auction, the
9Another interpretation is that the economy emerges from a recession and is about to enter a boom. Then
the cash generated in the past may not be enough to ﬁnance the more proﬁtable business opportunities in the
future. There is indeed some evidence that mergers are pro cyclical, see for instance Weston, Siu and Johnson
(2001).
10The second price auction and the lottery can be seen as special cases of the following function determining




3) as a function of cash si invested in the project by i. With θ = 0,
this is a lottery with probability of winning equal to 1/3 for each ﬁrm. With θ → +∞ the ﬁrm with the highest
(bid) si wins with probability 1 as in the second price auction. We assume ﬁrms pay nothing to participate in
the lottery and the winner pays the second highest bid in the auction. However, this could be generalized to
situations where money has to be sunk to enter the lottery and where each ﬁrm pays its own bid in the auction.
The point is how sensitive the outcome is to the ﬁrms’ actions.
11ﬁrm with the highest willingness to invest in the project wins. This we call a more competitive
process.
Is there an incentive to merge in the uncompetitive (lottery) situation? If ﬁrm a merges
with b, the probability of winning the new opportunity equals 1/2 instead of 1/3, however this
merger is never proﬁtable as the following calculation of ﬁrms’ values shows:11
Va = 5 + δ(7 + v/3) (6)
Vb = δ(7 + v/3) (7)
Vc = δ(13 + v/3) (8)
If a acquires b, he has to pay at least p ≥ δ(7 + v/3) but then clearly Vab ≤ 5 − δ(7 + v/3) +
δ(14 + v/2) < Va. Hence there is no merger in this case. Thus we ﬁnd that a switch from an
uncompetitive (lottery) system to a competitive auction system leads to more mergers. More
generally, in a more competitive environment constraints facing the ﬁrm become more binding.
Hence there is a bigger incentive to circumvent such constraints through M&A. This is our
interpretation of SF.3 in this set up.
This example can also be used to reiterate the point that acquiring another ﬁrm only
alleviates the acquiring ﬁrm’s cash constraint if the merged entity can deploy the resources
more successfully in winning the new opportunity. In the lottery example, the target b also
has a chance of winning the new business opportunity and hence it becomes too expensive to
acquire proﬁtably. In the auction set up, b has no chance of winning and hence the value of
the new opportunity v does not aﬀect Vb. Therefore, a can aﬀord to acquire b and the merger
becomes proﬁtable. In case of a lottery, v does increase Vb making it too expensive for a to
acquire no matter how high v is.
In order to analyze why mergers happen in waves and why acquiring ﬁrms may lose, we
extend the set up. We now consider four ﬁrms and at t = 2 there are two states of the world,
denoted s1,s2, which are equally likely. Holdings of cash and assets are given in table 2. Only
ﬁrms a and c hold cash m > 0 at time t = 1. Assets yield diﬀerent returns in diﬀerent states of
the world in the second period. The assets of the four agents yield no return in t = 3, but there
is the new opportunity that yields v/δ in period t = 3 (with probability 1). This opportunity
is auctioned oﬀ at the end of period 2 (using a second price auction).
11There is a parallel here with the Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) result that mergers (without eﬃciency
gains) are not proﬁtable under Cournot competition. The combined probability of winning for a and b is higher
(2/3) before the merger than after the merger (1/2).
12t = 1 t = 2,s1 t = 2,s2
a m 7 13
b 0 7 0
c m 13 7
d 0 0 7
Table 2: Cash and asset returns for the agents a,b,c and d.
If there are no M&As, the values of the ﬁrms equal12
Va = Vc = m +
δ
2
(13 + v) (9)




since the price for the new asset that a (resp. c) pays in state of the world s2 (s1) equals 7. If
v is too small to make an acquisition proﬁtable, there are no mergers. If there is an industry
shock such that v increases, a merger becomes proﬁtable. Since we want to argue that the
acquiring ﬁrms can actually lose from the M&A, we assume here that they pay the lowest price
possible for targets b and d: p =
δ
27. Clearly, if ﬁrms overpay for the acquisition, it is easier to
show that acquiring ﬁrms lose from M&A. The condition under which a acquires b is
Vab = m − p + 1
2δ(14 − 13 + 13 − 7) + δv > Va.
Firm a has 14 units of cash in state s1 (in t = 2) and hence can out-spend ﬁrm c by investing
13. In state s2, it wins the new opportunity at a price equal to 7 (as before). This inequality
holds for v big enough. Firm c acquires d (after a and b merged) if
Vcd = m − p +
1
2δ(13 + 14 − 13 + v) > m +
1
2δ(13 + 7)
If a and b merge, while c does not merge, the combined ﬁrm ab wins the new opportunity in
both states of nature. Hence, for v big enough there is a big incentive to merge for c and d as
well. This ensures that c wins in state s1. Thus we ﬁnd that a sudden increase in v makes an
acquisition proﬁtable for both a and c. This is one way to formalize a merger wave consistent
12In the case where m ≥ 6 we are implicitly assuming that δ is small enough that agents a and c do not want
to save m for the future such that they can bid 7 + m > 13 and win the asset for sale in both states of the
world. This simpliﬁes the exposition but is not essential.
13with SF.4. Although it is individually rational for each ﬁrm to merge, in fact, both ﬁrms lose
as the following comparison shows
m − p + 1






2δ. In other words, the merging game has a prisoners’ dilemma structure.
There is an incentive for ﬁrms a and c to acquire another ﬁrm, but with the mergers proﬁts
are lower than without mergers. If ﬁrms overpay to merge or if a merger leads to an eﬃciency
loss, this eﬀect becomes even stronger. This is how we interpret SF.6 within this framework.
The point is that the gain of one merger (winning the opportunity in both states of the world)
is undone by the other merger. Hence there is no gain for the ﬁrms but the price paid for the
new opportunity has gone up (13 instead of 7). Note that it is essential for this argument that
mergers happen in waves. An individual merger would still be proﬁtable (otherwise ﬁrms would
not undertake it in this framework).
The welfare eﬀects of such a merger wave depend on what happens with the increased
price for the new opportunity. If this is money wasted on lobbying and rent seeking, the
increased price (and thus the merger) can be seen as a welfare loss. If, instead, the increased
price is government revenue (say from selling a license) that allows the government to reduce
distortionary taxation, the welfare eﬀect can be positive. Similarly, if the increased price
represents higher investments in R&D (say, in a patent race setting) that generate positive
knowledge spillovers, the welfare eﬀects can be positive. Finally, one can also think of the
increased price as an increased investment in a war of attrition setting. Here the idea is that
ﬁrms compete so aggressively in a price war, that they do not cover their (per period) ﬁxed
costs. However, if consumers beneﬁt from this price war, a merger which prolongs the price
war can be welfare enhancing.
Above, the merger wave has been modeled as a change in exogenous parameters triggering
the mergers. Another way to model a merger wave is upward sloping reaction functions. If
your opponent acquires another ﬁrm, the incentive for you to acquire another ﬁrm goes up.
This we consider below.
143. General model
This section generalizes the model above. We derive suﬃcient conditions for the model to be
consistent with the stylized facts discussed above.
There are N ﬁrms in the industry under consideration. Firm i has eﬃciency vector ni ∈ IR
ν
and chooses a vector of strategic variables si ∈ Si ⊆ IR
k. The set Si describes the constraints




where R(.) is the revenue function that follows from choosing the vector si, the vector s =
s(s1,    ,sN) ∈ IR
K (where K equals at least 1 and at most Nk) summarizes the eﬀect of
all ﬁrms’ choices on revenue of ﬁrm i and θ ∈ IR parameterizes a change in the industry
(e.g. a rise in θ can denote that the industry becomes more competitive). As an illustration,
consider a Cournot model with N ﬁrms and linear demand for the goods of ﬁrm i of the form
pi = 1 − si − θ
 
j =i sj where pi is the price for product i, si is the output level of ﬁrm i and
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Then we write revenue for ﬁrm i as R(si,s,θ) = si(1 − (1 − θ)si − θs) where
s =
 N
i=1 si denotes total output. An increase in θ < 1 makes goods closer substitutes. This is
sometimes interpreted as more intense competition (see, for instance, Aghion, Harris, Howitt
and Vickers (2001) and Boone (2000)). Intuitively, with θ = 0 each ﬁrm has a monopoly and
with θ = 1 ﬁrms produce perfect substitutes which reduces their market power.
The function c(.) denotes the cost function which depends on the actions si chosen and the
eﬃciency ni of the ﬁrm. We assume that ﬁrm i chooses si while taking the actions of the other
ﬁrms j  = i as given (Nash equilibrium). We put the following structure on this set up.
Assumption 1 The function R : Si × IR




The function s : S1 ×     × SN → IR
K satisﬁes
∂s(s1,    ,sN)
∂si







¯ si ¯ s′
i ˆ s′
i ˆ si
Figure 1: The eﬀect of a merger on proﬁts and the strategic variable si
when the merger raises costs and relaxes the constraint si ≤ ¯ si.
and the cost function c : Si × IR







Before interpreting these assumptions, we make the following technical observations. We
view ∂R
∂s for K ≥ 2 as a column vector. The assumption says that all elements in this vector
are nonpositive. For k,K ≥ 2, the derivative ∂s
∂si is a matrix and the assumption says that each
element in this matrix is nonnegative.
We assume that higher values for s reduce revenue for a ﬁrm. In this sense we interpret
higher s as being a more aggressive outcome. Since each action of each ﬁrm contributes (weakly)
positively to s, higher choices for si are seen as more aggressive behavior by ﬁrm i. Hence, if
price is ﬁrm i’s choice variable, then we deﬁne si as minus the price (or one over the price)
such that higher si implies a more aggressive action. Finally, higher eﬃciency leads to (weakly)
lower costs and lower marginal costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of a merger if a ﬁrm faces the constraint that si cannot exceed
¯ si. The graph draws marginal revenue MRi(si) = dR(si,s,θ)/dsi and marginal costs MCi(si) =
dc(si,ni)/dsi. We assume that the merger reduces eﬃciency and hence shifts marginal costs
upwards.13 Further, the merger pushes out the constraint si ≤ ¯ si towards ¯ s′
i > ¯ si. Note that
13To keep the graph simple we assume that the merger does not aﬀect marginal revenue.
16MRi(¯ si) exceeds MCi(¯ si). This wedge creates the possibility that an eﬃciency reducing merger
is proﬁtable.14 Hence, the merger is proﬁtable only if area B (the rise in proﬁts due to increased
capacity) exceeds area A (the loss in proﬁts due to higher marginal costs).
Such a proﬁtable merger without eﬃciency gains (or even losses) is more likely (ceteris
paribus) the higher the marginal revenue curve. Since ﬁrms will tend to raise capacity through
internal growth if marginal revenue exceeds marginal costs, this scenario where MRi exceeds
MCi substantially is most likely to happen just after an industry shock has unexpectedly shifted
the MR curve upwards. Hence if more opportunities have suddenly opened up (SF. 2), MRi
shifts upward and mergers become more attractive as area B increases compared to A. Note
that an econometrician who measures eﬃciency (marginal costs) before and after the merger
will conclude that eﬃciency is reduced due to the merger. As mentioned in the introduction
that is indeed what is generally found in the empirical literature. However, the merger is still
proﬁtable due to the increase in capacity. Further, if welfare is increasing in si, then welfare
goes up as well in this example due to the merger. Finally, to illustrate the contrast with
a model without constraints the ﬁgure also shows the eﬀect on si when ﬁrm i can equalize
marginal revenue and marginal costs. Before the merger, ﬁrm i chooses ˆ si while after the
merger si equals ˆ s′
i < ˆ si. Hence the merger leads to a smaller ﬁrm, lower proﬁts and lower
welfare (assuming that welfare is increasing in si).
In this set up, we deﬁne an acquisition as follows. If ﬁrm a acquires some assets from target
ﬁrm t, the production possibility set for ﬁrm a (t) before the acquisition is denoted by S0
a (S0
t)




t ). For notational convenience we work with












t + (1 − αt)S
0
t
An increase dαa > 0 implies that the acquiring ﬁrm’s possibility set expands (as S1
a ⊃ S0
a).
Similarly, dαt > 0 implies that the target ﬁrm’s possibility set shrinks (as S1
t ⊂ S0
t). Let pa
denote the maximum price that the acquiring ﬁrm a is willing to pay for a partial acquisition
14Some people may argue that in the graph marginal costs equal marginal revenues if we deﬁne MCi(¯ si) = +∞
and hence there is no wedge. If one chooses this convention, the point is that in the limit: limsi↑¯ si MRi(si) −
MCi(si) > 0. Thus, either (mathematical) convention gives rise to a wedge in the sense that MRi −MCi > 0.
15We give dαt the opposite sign of dαa to make the price pt to be paid for the target positive. See equation
(12) below.





Similarly, the price that the target t should at least receive to agree to the acquisition dα > 0





An acquisition only happens if pa − pt > 0, that is if
d(R(sa,s,θ) − c(sa,na) − [R(st,s,θ) − c(st,nt)])
dα
> 0
We split the price pa (and similarly pt) in three terms: a wedge, an eﬃciency eﬀect and a









































      
strategic eﬀect
(13)
If the restrictions in the possibility set Sa are not binding, then clearly the wedge is zero in
Nash equilibrium (where ﬁrm a takes s−a as given when choosing sa).16 The ﬁrm raises each
element in the vector sa until marginal revenue equals marginal cost. However, if one of the
restrictions is binding then although it would be proﬁtable to raise sak for some k, it is not
possible. Hence the wedge in this dimension is strictly positive. If an acquisition allows ﬁrm




dα > 0. We split this eﬀect into
a wedge and a strategic eﬀect, where the wedge is the ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm i when
choosing sa in Nash equilibrium. The strategic eﬀect takes into account that the merger aﬀects
s−a in a way that is overlooked by the ﬁrm when choosing sa.17 The eﬃciency eﬀect captures
16The equation can be generalized to other equilibrium concepts than a Nash equilibrium in the variables
sa,s−a, like for instance a Stackelberg leadership for ﬁrm a. We then write s(sa,s−a(sa)). In this case there
is only a strategic eﬀect if the merger aﬀects s−a in ways that are not incorporated in s−a(sa). For notational
convenience we work with equation (13) in its Nash equilibrium form.
17Hence we make the same assumption as in Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). In the ﬁrst stage
when ﬁrms decide whether to merge or not, ﬁrms understand how the merger will aﬀect the equilibrium played
in the second stage. In the second stage, when each ﬁrm i chooses si, it takes s−i as given following the Nash
equilibrium assumption.
18the eﬀect of the merger on the eﬃciency of the ﬁrm. Consider the following two well-known
examples as illustrations of equation (13).
Example 1 Consider a Cournot duopoly with demand of the form pi = 1−si−θsj where each
ﬁrm’s strategic variable is output and θ ∈  0,1]. Firm i’s costs are given by c(si,ni) = si/ni.
Then we deﬁne the aggregate aggression level as the sum of the two output levels, s = s1 + s2
and write ﬁrm i’s revenue as R(si,s) = (1−θs−(1−θ)si)si. Under Cournot competition ﬁrm
i chooses its output level si taking the output level of the other ﬁrm as given. Hence ds/dsi = 1.
It is routine to verify that the Cournot Nash output level of ﬁrm i is given by
si =
2 − θ − 2
ni + θ
nj
(2 + θ)(2 − θ)






while ﬁrm 2 is not constraint (S2 = IR+). Then it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to choose s1 = q while
ﬁrm 2 sets s2 =
1−θq−1/n2
2 . We consider the eﬀect of ﬁrm 1 being able to acquire some production
capacity from a ﬁrm outside this industry such that dq/dα > 0. What is the maximum price
ﬁrm 1 is willing to pay for this acquisition? Following equation (13) above, we write this price
as



















where ds/ds2 = 1,ds2/dα = −1
2θ(dq/dα). Because of the capacity constraint s1 ≤ q the wedge
term is strictly positive. We are interested in cases where mergers make sense for ﬁrms even













This is the eﬀect of an increase in s1 on s2 that ﬁrm 1 overlooks in equilibrium when choosing
s1 (because the Cournot Nash assumption here is that output s2 is given). Hence, even if the
merger reduces ﬁrm 1’s eﬃciency (dn1/dα < 0) it can still be proﬁtable as ﬁrm 1’s capacity q is
expanded.18 Moreover, if welfare is increasing in total output s, the merger is welfare enhancing
since ds/dα = (1 − 1
2θ)dq/dα > 0.
18Note that ﬁrm 1 here merges with a ﬁrm outside of its industry (conglomerate merger). This diﬀers from
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) where two ﬁrms in the same Cournot market (horizontally) merge.
19Example 2 Consider the case of a homogenous good market with demand q = s where q is
total output and s equals one over the lowest price charged in the market, s = 1/p. There are
N ﬁrms and ﬁrm i with output level qi has costs equal to c(qi,ni) = qi/ni with n1 > n2 > n3 ≥
... ≥ nN > 1. Firm i chooses price level pi = 1/si. Then the Bertrand Nash equilibrium price
equals 1/max{s1,...,sN} = 1/s1 = 1/n2 and total output equals q = q1 = n2. Now consider
a merger of ﬁrms 1 and 2 that does not aﬀect 1’s eﬃciency level. Then the whole eﬀect is
strategic.19 Merging 1 and 2 has no eﬀect on cost levels nor on production possibilities. It only
oﬀers 1 the opportunity to raise its price to 1/n3. In this case without eﬃciency gains, the
merger is always welfare reducing.
The last example considers the simple case of homogenous goods. But as shown in Deneckere
and Davidson (1985) the results also hold for Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products
where the merger does not lead to eﬃciency gains. The result is due to upward sloping reaction
functions. In Bertrand equilibrium each ﬁrm takes the other ﬁrms’ prices as given. When two
ﬁrms merge, they internalize the positive externality of a price increase on their ’partner’ ﬁrm
and hence raise their price. In response, the ﬁrms outside of the merger increase their price
(upward sloping reaction function) as well, which is the strategic eﬀect. Hence the merger is
proﬁtable for the merging ﬁrms but welfare reducing.
Considering equation (13) shows why the theoretical literature until now has emphasized
eﬃciency gains due to mergers and acquisitions. If ﬁrms face no constraints (as is usually
assumed), the wedge equals zero. Then a merger is only proﬁtable if either the eﬃciency eﬀect
is positive or the strategic eﬀect is positive. If the eﬃciency eﬀect disappears (as seems to be
the case on average in the data), mergers are only proﬁtable if they lead to a less aggressive
outcome in the industry (lower s). We call mergers reducing (raising) aggregate aggression s
anti (pro) competitive.20 In a Cournot or Bertrand model this implies that total output goes
down in an anti competitive merger which is welfare reducing. Hence either a merger raises
eﬃciency or it should be abolished from a welfare point of view. This is summarized in the
following proposition.
19Because 1’s proﬁt function is discontinuous around a price equal to 1/n2, the ﬁrst derivative is not zero.
However, one can still argue that zero is an element of the superdiﬀerential and hence the wedge is zero in
equilibrium.
20There is an issue here with terminology. Some people call a merger anti competitive if it reduces welfare.
This implicitly assumes that mergers which intensify competition also raise welfare. Since there is not such a
simple relation between competition intensity and welfare, we prefer to distinguish anti/pro competitive eﬀects
of a merger form the welfare eﬀects.
20Proposition 1 Assume K = 1. If the wedge is equal to zero and the merger does not raise
eﬃciency then either the merger is not proﬁtable (pa < 0) or it is anti-competitive in the
sense that it reduces s. If welfare is increasing in s, then an anti-competitive merger is welfare
reducing.
Allowing for a positive wedge, however, changes this picture. Because of a positive wedge,
acquisitions that are pro competitive and eﬃciency reducing can still be proﬁtable.21 If the
competition authority’s objective function assigns positive weight to producer surplus, the
eﬃciency loss is welfare reducing. However, this eﬀect is internalized by the ﬁrm. If the
merger is proﬁtable it must be the case that the wedge eﬀect outweighs the eﬃciency eﬀect. If
the competition authority just maximizes consumer surplus (and assuming consumer surplus
is increasing in aggregate aggression s), then the welfare eﬀect depends just on whether the
merger is pro or anti competitive in the sense of increasing or decreasing s.
Thus a positive wedge makes it possible to incorporate stylized fact SF.1 and leave room
for a pro competitive merger that is still proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. That is, even if a merger does
not raise eﬃciency it is not necessarily the case that every proﬁtable merger reduces welfare
and should therefore be abolished by a competition authority. Further, because acquisitions
can reduce eﬃciency, there is not necessarily a tendency to merge for monopoly. Models that
assume that mergers raise eﬃciency tend to predict that ﬁrms keep on merging (if not blocked
by a competition authority) because both the eﬃciency gain and the increase in monopoly
power are proﬁtable for the ﬁrms involved. This prediction is clearly refuted by empirical
evidence: many ﬁrms could merge (from a competition policy point of view) but don’t do so.
Since we allow for mergers reducing eﬃciency, this empirical observation is consistent with the
framework here.
4. Timing and proﬁtability of mergers
In this section we consider the other stylized facts in the light of the model introduced above.
First, we consider SF.2, SF.3 and SF.4 which deal with the timing when M&A’s happen. Then
21In the literature on vertical restraints and vertical mergers (see, for instance, Rey and Verg´ e (2005) and
Motta (2003)) this point is well known. A vertical merger that internalizes an externality between the upstream
and downstream ﬁrms can be both welfare enhancing and proﬁtable for the ﬁrms (without necessarily increasing
either ﬁrm’s eﬃciency level). The point is that the externality creates a positive wedge for the merged entity.
An example here is double marginalization. The idea that the ﬁrm is constrained allows us to use the same
wedge intuition for horizontal and conglomerate mergers.
21we consider the proﬁtability of mergers and the way these proﬁts are distributed between target
and acquiring ﬁrms (SF. 5 and 6).
4.1. Liberalizing the industry
In our model, ﬁrm a only acquires (part of) t if pa − pt > 0. We assume that ﬁrms a and t













where the production possibility set Sα
a (Sα
t ) in nondecreasing (nonincreasing) in α. The case
α = 0 denotes no acquisition of assets by a, while α = 1 denotes the case where ﬁrm a (t)







take the possibilities created by the merger (i.e. S1
a,S1
t) as exogenously given. Firms choose
the degree α of the transfer to maximize the joint value of the ﬁrms. Note that we allow the
eﬃciency of a to fall due to the merger (i.e. we allow n′
a(α) < 0).























In the framework here, changes in the industry, like liberalization and deregulation, are captured
by θ. We say that an increase in θ makes an acquisition by a from t more likely if d∆/dθ > 0.
One way to formalize the idea of acquisitions becoming more likely is the following. For each
pair of ﬁrms there is a random cost γ ∈ [0,¯ γ] of negotiating the merger. The distribution
function of γ is denoted by F(.). Hence ﬁrms a and t only merge if ∆ > γ. The probability
that this happens, is given by F(∆). As ∆ increases, the probability of a merger increases.
Hence there are negotiating costs (say, due to asymmetric information) that may prevent a
merger even though ∆ > 0. However, we assume that once ﬁrms decide to merge, they choose
α such that the total value created by the merger is maximized. This maximizes the probability
that a price p can be negotiated such that pt < p < pa.
The following proposition derives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for d∆/dθ > 0, where
Rα
a denotes R(sa,s,θ) after a has acquired a fraction α from t’s assets, R0
a denotes R(sa,s,θ)
before the merger (α = 0) and similarly for Rα
t ,R0
t.























0 as a’s production possibility sets expands while t’s set shrinks. To get some intuition for
equation (16), we consider a number of cases. First, consider a conglomerate merger where the
liberalization dθ > 0 takes place in a’s sector but where t is not aﬀected either by θ nor by the
consequent change in s in a’s sector.22 Such a change in θ makes the acquisition of t by a more













Hence, the merger becomes more likely if the industry shock dθ > 0 has the direct eﬀect
of increasing revenue for a after the merger compared to the situation without the merger.
Think of the merger between Reed Elsevier and Mead Data Central (see Introduction). As the
internet revolution unfolded, Reed Elsevier’s lack of knowledge of electronic publishing became
more and more a binding constraint. Due to lack of know how, it could not expand in this
direction. As more and more people started to use internet, the marginal revenue curve kept
on moving upwards (see ﬁgure 1) thereby widening the wedge in that dimension. This made
the (conglomerate) merger between Reed Elsevier and Mead Data Central more and more
attractive.
If we think of dθ > 0 as liberalization/deregulation of the sector, we may expect that s goes
up as well: competition becomes more intense. Indeed the goal of liberalization/deregulation
often is to get more aggressive conduct and a more competitive outcome in the industry. If this






In this case, the increased aggregate aggression s further stimulates the merger. Firm a after
the merger can respond more adequately to increased aggression after the liberalization as the
merger alleviates constraints that held ﬁrm a back.
22Note that s is a vector which has elements pertaining to a’s and t’s sector. The elements of this vector s
that change (due to θ) do not aﬀect t’s proﬁts in this case.
23In the conglomerate merger setting, we can also have the case where ﬁrm t’s sector faces
deregulation while a’s sector is unaﬀected by θ. Deregulation in t’s sector makes the acquisition













In words, the increase in θ has the direct eﬀect of reducing t’s valuation of the assets it can
transfer to a. For instance, deregulation may marginalize ﬁrm t such that its chances of survival






this further marginalizes ﬁrm t and the diﬀerence between R0
t and Rα
t becomes smaller. Hence,
it becomes more likely that a and t can agree on a price p to transfer the assets.
In the context of a horizontal merger where both a and t are aﬀected by θ, the interpretation
of equation (16) is as follows. The direct eﬀect of an increase in θ is to increase the value of
the acquired assets to a, Rα
a − R0
a, relative to the value of these assets to t, R0
t − Rα
t . Hence
the direct eﬀect of the liberalization is to increase the wedge for a between marginal revenues
and marginal costs in dimensions where t’s assets can alleviate constraints. If the liberalization








The increase in competition s raises the value of the assets for ﬁrm a relative to ﬁrm t.
This is a generalization of the example in section 2 where the new opportunity was ﬁrst
allocated by lottery to one of the ﬁrms a,b and c. In this case, it is not optimal for ﬁrms to
merge since ﬁrm b is too expensive for a to acquire. Then the sector was liberalized and the
new opportunity was allocated using an auction. With the auction, ﬁrm b has no chance of
winning the new opportunity while it has a chance to win with the lottery. Hence the switch
from lottery to auction reduces the value of ﬁrm b making it more attractive to be acquired
by a. Moreover, the switch to the auction allocation makes the target ﬁrm more attractive to
the acquiring ﬁrm a. The return to alleviating a’s (cash) constraint is bigger with an auction
compared to a lottery to allocate the new opportunity. The liberalization increases the return
to a’s constraint dimension (cash) compared to t’s return in this dimension.
24We focus in this paper on the new idea that deregulation can trigger mergers that are pro
competitive but do not raise eﬃciency. However, the framework here is consistent with the idea
in, for instance, Fridolfsson and Stennek (forthcoming) that ﬁrms merge to reduce overcapacity
in the industry. In this case the change in θ is a reduction in demand. Constraints are not the
issue in this case but, instead, overcapacity. Such a merger can be proﬁtable by the strategic
eﬀect. Firm a buys assets from t which are reduced in value due to the overcapacity in the
sector (say, due to an unexpected fall in demand). Firm a then destroys these assets (or does
not use them in this sector) to reduce total output s. Such anti-competitive mergers can indeed
be proﬁtable for a and thus are consistent with the framework here.
We conclude the section by looking at merger waves as mentioned in SF.4. In this context
there are two reasons why we can get a merger wave after liberalization. First, the increase in
θ may increase the diﬀerence ∆ in equation (15) for a number of pairs of acquiring and target
ﬁrms. This liberalization then triggers a set of mergers. A second explanation for a merger
wave is that the increase in θ causes the ﬁrms a and t to merge which in turn increases ∆ for
another pair of ﬁrms a′,t′. This explanation of a merger wave can be formalized as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that an increase in θ leads to a merger between a and t. This makes










where α(α′) denotes the transfer of assets between a and t (a′ and t′).
Hence, if the merger between a and t is pro competitive then we get a merger wave if
inequality (17) holds for the pair a′,t′: the merger between a and t makes the merger between
a′ and t′ more likely. This generalizes the example in section 2 where the merger between ﬁrms
a and b makes the merger between c and d more proﬁtable. There aggregate aggression is
measured by the price paid for the new opportunity. The merger between a and b intensiﬁes
competition by driving this price upward. This makes it proﬁtable for c and d to merge as well.
Alternatively, if the merger between a and t is anti competitive (ds/dα < 0) then it makes the
merger between a′ and t′ more likely if (17) holds with the opposite sign.
4.2. Unproﬁtable mergers
In this section we consider the last two stylized facts: SF.5 and 6. The former is quite straight-
forward in this context. A target ﬁrm always gains as it only sells out if p > pt. Depending
25on the bargaining power of t and whether other ﬁrms than a try to acquire t as well, the price
for t can be substantially above pt. Especially if an increase in θ opens up new opportunities
that t on its own cannot beneﬁt from. If t’s assets allow a to beneﬁt more from the new op-
portunities, the value of t in an acquisition increases. Thus the acquisition price for t’s assets
can lie substantially above t’s own valuation of the assets. Hence, in this context SF.5 is not
surprising.
In the same vein, if t has substantial bargain power (e.g. because other ﬁrms are bidding for
t as well), the acquiring ﬁrm does not gain much. Moreover, the merger can be rational while
the acquiring ﬁrm loses if dθ > 0 triggers a merger wave. In our set up, the increase in θ (ceteris
paribus) is seen as good news: new opportunities open up. In other words, we allow for the fact
that the direct eﬀect of θ is to raise R. Above we have looked at pro-competitive mergers (not
anti-competitive to reduce aggregate capacity as in Fridolfsson and Stennek (forthcoming)23),
we ﬁnd proﬁt reductions due to mergers in the following way.
An increase in θ which raises aggregate aggression from s to s′ > s due to a pro competitive































The expression in the second line is the ﬁrm’s proﬁt after the acquisition of ﬁrm b (where
maxst∈S0
t[R(st,s′,θ) − c(st,nt)] − maxst∈Sα
t [R(st,s′,θ) − c(st,n′
t)] is the (minimum) price ﬁrm
a has to pay to buy t).24 The proﬁt level on the ﬁrst line is the proﬁt level without the (pro
competitive) merger wave (where s remains low). Hence the ﬁrst inequality implies that the
mergers lead to lower proﬁts for the ﬁrms. However, the inequality on the second line tells
us that the merger is rational in the sense that proﬁts of ﬁrm a are higher after the merger
with t than it would be without the merger. Hence although the increase in θ leads to new
opportunities for the ﬁrms, the competition for these opportunities (including the mergers)
competes these rents away. As a result, proﬁts are lower for the ﬁrms than in the case without
23In Fridolfsson and Stennek (forthcoming) an increase in θ is actually bad news about the sector (recession)
which triggers mergers to reduce excess capacity and reduces proﬁts. Hence empirical researchers that cannot
control very well for the industry speciﬁc eﬀect (recession) ﬁnd the correlation between merger activity and
reduced proﬁts.
24Again we assume that a pays the lowest price at which t is willing to sell. With a higher acquisition price
it is easier to show that the merger reduces proﬁts.
26mergers. The merger game has a prisoner’s dilemma structure in this case. If the higher s is
beneﬁcial for consumers, then the mergers are welfare enhancing.
For an example of this prisoner dilemma structure, see section 2 where the mergers between
a and b and between c and d are rational but the mergers do lead to lower proﬁts for both the
combinations a&b and c&d.
5. Constraints facing the ﬁrm
The two main motivations for constraints that we mention in the introduction are capital
market imperfections and time to market. Above we have derived results in a general model,
here we illustrate how capital market constraints and time to market can be formalized in
simple models. In both cases, the imperfection leads to a wedge between marginal costs and
marginal revenue for the ﬁrm.
5.1. Capital market imperfections
Here we formalize a moral hazard story (in line with Gale and Hellwig (1986)) leading to capital
market imperfections. Assume that a ﬁrm has an amount of money m and needs to invest p > m
to buy an asset that will yield a pay oﬀ in the next period (where we ignore discounting for
ease if exposition). Hence the ﬁrm has to borrow an amount equal to p − m > 0 to ﬁnance
the asset. If the entrepreneur invests eﬀort at cost e > 0, there is a probability π ∈  0,1  that
the project is successful and yields pay oﬀ V > 0; with probability 1 − π the project is not
successful and yields 0. If the entrepreneur shirks, he has no eﬀort cost and the probability of
success is 0 (i.e. pay oﬀ to the project is always 0).
To motivate the entrepreneur to invest eﬀort, the return to the entrepreneur should be s
where s satisﬁes
πs ≥ e
because otherwise the entrepreneur will shirk. With limited liability, return to the bank is
π(V − s). Hence the bank only lends money to the ﬁrm if
π(V − e/π) ≥ p − m
or equivalently
πV − p ≥ e − m
27If e − m > 0 then it follows that πV − p > 0 and hence there is a wedge due to the capital
market imperfection. In principle, all projects with a positive net present value, πV − p ≥ 0
should be ﬁnanced but due to the moral hazard problem only projects with πV −p ≥ e−m > 0
are actually ﬁnanced. This wedge creates the possibility that ﬁrms merge although the merger
itself reduces eﬃciency. If the merger increases either the assets m or the return V (as more
projects are managed), the merged ﬁrm can borrow more to ﬁnance new projects as the merger
relaxes the constraint πV − p ≥ e − m.
Alternatively, the merger could create more collateral for the ﬁrm that can be used for a
mortgage. This also makes the shirking option less attractive and helps the ﬁrm to overcome
the capital market constraint. Indeed, Weston, Siu and Johnson (2001) review some empirical
studies indicating that the debt capacity of the combined ﬁrm can be greater than the sum
of the two ﬁrms’ capacities before the merger. Hence the results derived in section 2 with an
extreme form of capital market imperfection (no borrowing at all) can be generalized to more
realistic situations where ﬁrms can borrow to some extent as long as the capital market is not
perfect. The assumption needed is that the ﬁrm has a strictly positive wedge in some dimension
and a capital market imperfection generates such a wedge.
5.2. Time to market
As mentioned in the introduction, time to market is an important consideration in M&A’s.
Most constraints can be solved using internal growth, but acquisitions relax constraints faster
(also see Weston, Siu and Johnson (2001, pp. 143)). This time gain is so important in some
markets that ﬁrms are willing to sacriﬁce eﬃciency just to reduce time to market. The trade
oﬀ we consider here is the following. When solving a constraint through internal growth,
the solution can be geared to the way the organization works and will therefore be eﬃcient.
However, ﬁnding all the right employees and other ingredients and putting them together will
take time. If the ﬁrm acquires another ﬁrm (or part of that ﬁrm), the constraint is taken care of
more quickly but the new ﬁrm may not ﬁt perfectly into the existing organization and therefore
a loss of eﬃciency may result.
For concreteness, think of a ﬁrm that wants to enter a new market segment, say it wants
to introduce an improved version of a DVD player. To do this, it needs to undertake R&D
to invent the better player. The knowledge for such an innovation is currently not present in
the ﬁrm. Hence the ﬁrm can open up vacancies for R&D personnel and in this way create an
R&D department. It can then hire people that ﬁt the culture of the organization etc. Selecting
28and hiring all these employees will, however, take quite some time. Alternatively, the ﬁrm can
decide to acquire a small start up ﬁrm that works in the area in which the ﬁrm expects the
breakthrough for the new player. In that way the R&D department will be up and running
sooner. However, the ﬁt with the rest of the organization will be smaller which may lead to
eﬃciency losses.
More formally, assume that ﬁrm i wants to bring a new product to the market. If it does
develop all relevant capabilities internally, it can start selling the new product from time ti
onwards at a cost of I(ti) with I(0) = +∞,I′(.) < 0,I′′(.) > 0. Starting production today is
prohibitively expensive and the longer one waits with the introduction, the cheaper it becomes.
Proﬁts per period for the ﬁrm of selling the new product are determined by its own time to
market ti, the vector of competitors’ time of introducing a comparable product t−i and ﬁrm i’s










The sooner i is in the market, the higher its per period proﬁts. For instance, there could be
switching costs and/or network eﬀects. Hence, if i is in the market sooner, it is more likely that
consumers buy from i as well in the future (because of switching costs most existing customers
replace their product by a new one from i; because of network eﬀects new consumers tend to
buy product i as well if their friends use i already etc.). In the same vein, if competitor j comes
earlier into the market, proﬁts for i go down. Finally, as above, higher eﬃciency levels lead to
higher proﬁts.

















Because of the I′(ti) < 0 term, there is a wedge and the ﬁrm is willing to sacriﬁce eﬃciency ni
to get to the market more quickly. Suppose that ﬁrm i merges with an R&D lab that provides
29the relevant capabilities. In this way, it can get to the market at time tm
i < ti but reduces the
eﬃciency to nm















where p is the price to acquire the R&D lab. Due to the positive wedge, the merger can be
proﬁtable although it reduces eﬃciency.
If other ﬁrms acquire business units as well to get to the market faster, we can get a merger




The sooner your opponent gets to the market, the higher the return to being fast yourself. In
this way, one merger may trigger another. If consumers appreciate being served sooner, welfare
may go up although eﬃciency is reduced and ﬁrms can loose from such a merger wave, as shown
above.
6. Conclusion
This paper has introduced the idea that ﬁrms cannot equalize marginal costs and marginal
revenues in all dimensions of their action space. In other words, ﬁrms face constraints. If a
merger alleviates a constraint, a merger can be both proﬁtable and welfare enhancing even
though the merger does not raise (or even reduces) eﬃciency. In this way, we move away
from the more traditional IO models of mergers that depend on eﬃciency gains to understand
how mergers can be both proﬁtable and welfare enhancing (and thus should be allowed by a
competition authority). The problem with these theoretical models is that there is no empirical
evidence showing that most (or even many) mergers actually raise eﬃciency.
Using this idea that ﬁrms merge in response to constraints that they face, we can explain
a number of stylized facts concerning mergers. Mergers happen after new opportunities have
opened up and after the sector has become more competitive, say due to deregulation and
liberalization. The idea is that such industry shocks shift the marginal revenue curve upward,
increasing the shadow value of the constraint and thereby making mergers to alleviate the
30constraint more proﬁtable. Mergers happen in waves where one merger triggers the next merger.
If ﬁrms’ choice variables are strategic complements (upward sloping reaction functions), then
if a merger allows one ﬁrm to spend more on, say, R&D or to introduce its products sooner
this will raise the incentives for other ﬁrms as well to spend more on R&D using acquisitions.
Finally, merger waves can explain why rational mergers can be associated with a reduction in
proﬁts after the merger. Pro competitive mergers help ﬁrms to compete more ﬁercely, thereby
competing the rents away that were created by deregulation of the sector.
The implications for competition policy of the framework introduced here are as follows.
First, given the empirical literature on eﬃciency gains of mergers, less emphasis should be
placed on an eﬃciency defence. Without eﬃciency gains, the traditional literature suggests
that horizontal mergers should be abolished as they can only be motivated by market power.
In a world where ﬁrms face constraints, however, there are other arguments that the ﬁrms can
use to defend their merger. They should argue that the acquisition allows them to expand
in areas (either geographically or in product space) that they otherwise would not be able
to exploit. For instance, the merger allows them to invest in R&D as it alleviates a capital
market constraint or the merger allows them to invent a new product more quickly than the
ﬁrm would otherwise be able to do. If the ﬁrms can argue that these new opportunities opened
up by the merger create surplus for consumers, then the merger should be allowed, even though
it does not increase eﬃciency. These gains should then be weighed against the strategic eﬀect
if the merger increases market power. In line with the existing literature, we also ﬁnd that
anti competitive eﬀects of mergers are more likely with horizontal mergers than conglomerate
mergers.
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34Appendix A. Proofs of results
Proof of proposition 2
Deriving d∆/dθ while using an envelope argument for α and sa,st (both before and after
the merger) leads to expression in the proposition. If one of these variables (that are optimally
chosen) has an interior solution in equation (15), the ﬁrst derivative equals zero and a small
change in this variable has no eﬀect on ∆. If a variable has a corner solution, like sa hitting a
constraint in some dimension k or α = 1, then a small change in θ will not aﬀect the optimal
value of this variable. Q.E.D.
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